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This programmatic option describes the first step towards monitoring and responding to risks and incidents of electoral violence through an initial assessment informing the design and implementation of an electoral early warning and early response system.
An electoral violence risk assessment is a structured process aimed at identifying, analysing and prioritizing potential risks of violence associated with an electoral process. It provides a foundation for designing targeted prevention and mitigation strategies, ensuring that election stakeholders can effectively manage and respond to emerging threats. This assessment typically consists of the following activities:
Identifying potential sources of electoral violence by examining the specific contextual and process-related factors that could lead to instability or conflict. This includes:
Evaluating the likelihood and impact of identified risks to prioritize the most critical threats. This process also involves identifying underlying assumptions about the electoral context and stakeholders’ behaviour.
Establishing measurable indicators to monitor and track the identified risks. For example:
Continuously monitoring the context using predefined indicators to detect signs of escalating tensions or emerging risks. This may include analysing patterns of violence, tracking public sentiment or monitoring critical milestones in the electoral process.
Producing actionable recommendations for prevention and response, based on the findings. The report should:
By focusing on these elements, an electoral violence risk assessment directly informs programmatic strategies to prevent and address violence, making it an essential tool for fostering peaceful and credible elections.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to risk management for elections across all stakeholders. The risk analysis phase is particularly challenging, as it will often need to consider a broad range of factors including sensitive issues such as political conditions and dynamics. A typical analytical approach will involve steps including a context analysis to identify contentious issues, an analysis of the potential causes of conflict as well as factors that will support peace, a stakeholder analysis (sometimes including a form of political-economy analysis) and an electoral triggers analysis (combining structural risks and triggers). The risk assessment process will often lead to programming recommendations.
National ownership for the management of risks around elections is a principal concern. The remedies and actions to mitigate and respond to electoral violence rest primarily with national authorities. As such, an inclusive process of risk analysis and subsequent management needs to engage the host government and national stakeholders in many elements. The sharing of information among stakeholders to establish a common baseline of risks is an important consideration and promotes the use of multi-stakeholder approaches.
Risk assessments lay the foundation of early warning and response systems. However, those actors best placed to design and deliver on the risk assessment may not be best suited to conduct monitoring, while the mitigation and response actions may require another set of stakeholders. Connecting the processes of risk assessment, monitoring and actions therefore needs to consider a wide range of actors and their capacities.
Establishing an institutional host for the electoral risk assessment can be tied to a range of factors. An election authority is often a natural host in the election period, but if the authority is non-permanent, other solutions may need to be considered for the period between elections. Sustainability through follow-up to the electoral risk assessment should therefore be a consideration. In some cases, CSOs engaged in long-term conflict mapping may be a suitable candidate.
Determining the best actor(s) to conduct an electoral violence risk assessment depends on their expertise, mandate and access to information. Each actor – human rights commissions (HRCs), EMBs, CSOs, State institutions and media – has unique strengths and limitations that determine their role in the process. Here is an elaboration on each:
A multi-stakeholder approach led by HRCs ensures comprehensive risk identification while fostering public trust. Human rights commissions have a long-term mandate and the neutrality needed to foster institutional trust. Civil society organizations enhance grassroots monitoring, EMBs provide technical insights, and security forces are well placed to identify security risk. Strengthened links between institutions and CSOs diminish the likelihood of violence and build confidence in democratic processes. Establishing joint mechanisms (e.g. task forces) to integrate diverse inputs improves coordination and promote sustainable and inclusive risk assessments may be a good way forward.
The conduct of an electoral violence risk assessment must be guided by the review and evaluation of electoral and conflict-related data concerning previous electoral periods. Furthermore, the conduct of these assessments should be conducted in coordination and collaboration with relevant State and non-State institutions (e.g. EMBs, security forces, CSOs, etc.) to ensure the findings capture and are aligned with previous experiences during electoral processes.
In numerous contexts worldwide, youth constitute the biggest percentage of voters. Consequently, any electoral violence risk assessment must carefully study the role of the youth during electoral processes, both as potential drivers of peace, playing an important role in communication and mediation efforts related to the transparent and inclusive conduct of the electoral process, as well as at times drivers of conflict, sometimes being instrumentalized by political parties and candidates in manners that can potentially destabilize the elections. In order to involve youth in the conduct of an electoral violence risk assessment, their views should not be simply studied, but rather integrated into the assessment itself through indicators and their participation in the process.
To ensure gender sensitivity in an electoral violence risk assessment, data must be disaggregated by gender, considering the different risks men, women and marginalized groups face, such as physical violence, harassment or exclusion. Diverse stakeholder engagement, including women’s organizations and LGBTQ+ groups, is essential to incorporate perspectives on gender-specific violence. The risk analysis should include gender-sensitive indicators, focusing on threats to female candidates, voters and activists, and factors that exacerbate violence, like discriminatory laws or power imbalances.
Further, the assessment team should be trained on recognizing gender-specific risks, and gender experts should be involved. The assessment must also examine legal protections, recommend reforms if necessary and monitor post-election violence affecting women or marginalized genders. Reports should include gender-sensitive recommendations to mitigate these risks and promote an inclusive and safe electoral environment.
When communicating about an electoral violence risk assessment, it is crucial to present findings clearly and objectively, emphasizing the key risks, affected groups and potential triggers of violence. Tailor the message for different audiences, such as policymakers, security agencies, civil society and the media, using language that is accessible and free of jargon. Highlight both the general risks and any gender-specific threats, ensuring transparency in methodology and data sources. Provide actionable recommendations, prioritizing preventive measures and interventions, and maintain a neutral tone to avoid escalating tensions.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that not all information from the risk assessment should be made publicly available, especially if it is sensitive or could inadvertently increase vulnerabilities. For example, detailed findings about potential violence hotspots or specific vulnerabilities of certain groups could be misused by bad actors or heighten tensions if improperly shared. Striking a balance between transparency and discretion is critical, with sensitive information shared selectively among trusted stakeholders who are best placed to act on it responsibly
When conducting an electoral violence risk assessment, effective coordination with various actors is essential to gain a comprehensive understanding of the potential risks and to formulate effective prevention strategies. First and foremost, it is a priority to collaborate with government bodies like electoral commissions and security agencies to access official data and insights into the political climate and security measures in place. Secondly, it is critical to also get the perspective of CSOs, including human rights groups and local NGOs, to gather grassroots information on community tensions and historical patterns of violence. International organizations and observer missions can offer comparative perspectives and technical expertise, enhancing the assessment’s credibility and scope.
Involving a diverse range of stakeholders enriches the assessment by incorporating multiple viewpoints and expertise. Other key stakeholders to engage include political parties and candidates to understand their concerns and commitments to peaceful elections. Media outlets and journalists should be involved to assess the role of information dissemination in either mitigating or exacerbating tensions. Marginalized groups such as women, youth, ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities must be consulted to ensure their specific risks and vulnerabilities are addressed. Additionally, traditional and religious leaders can provide valuable insights into community dynamics and play a pivotal role in promoting peace.
The nature of an electoral violence risk assessment means it is likely to only be relevant for a particular electoral process. Nevertheless, through subsequent reviews and updates and through the continuous application of specific methodology and indicators across numerous electoral violence risk assessments, a particular assessment can be useful for subsequent processes, provided the data are aligned and comparable.
The main costs associated with conducting an electoral violence risk assessment exercise depend on the availability of personnel for the exercise and the extent of travel needed. Therefore, costs to be considered include:
The process of assessment and analysis is often a politically sensitive activity. The timing and receptiveness of institutions and organizations involved in the risk assessment should be gauged, and the process should be undertaken as an inclusive exercise with multiple stakeholders. Often it may be preferable to consider such exercises in their positive framing to assist in building the credibility and peacefulness of an election process.
The timing of introducing an electoral violence risk assessment is a key consideration. If initiated shortly before the start of an election process, the potential for and range of follow-up actions and responses can be more limited than where an assessment is conducted well ahead of an election process.
A comprehensive approach to election risk management necessitates sustained efforts and commitment across the electoral cycle. Risk assessments should be integrated into a broader, ongoing risk management framework that includes prevention, mitigation and response actions. Achieving this often requires continuous technical, financial and political support from stakeholders involved in the process. Identifying an appropriate institutional host to oversee and maintain the risk management approach over the long term is a critical factor in ensuring its effectiveness and sustainability.
International IDEA, Election Risk Management Tool
The IDEA Election Risk Management Tool (ERMTool) launched its development in 2009 and became available as a free resource in 2013. The tool exists as a turnkey ICT solution (a custom database solution) that allows for the customization and collection of data, generates risk maps and maintains a register of risks and actions. The ICT tool is complemented by three guides for 36 internal and external risks, as well as a manual to consider preventive actions based around a three-tier approach of addressing electoral management and justice, election security and infrastructure for peace. The ERMTool is intended to assist EMBs in managing electoral risks but may also be used by other stakeholders with an interest in managing electoral risks.
UNDP, Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming
The UNDP Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming provides readers with practical options and tools for programming design, early warning and conflict tracking. Drawing on seven country case studies (Bangladesh, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria and Sierra Leone), it presents lessons learned and good practices from the field in the framework for United Nations engagement in electoral assistance.
IFES, White Paper, Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention (2002)
This IFES White Paper assesses patterns of electoral violence and conflict and the role of election security. The paper presents a clustering approach to electoral violence around stages of identity, campaign conflict, balloting conflict, results conflict and representation conflict that arise in the course of an election process. A case study of Kosovo (2000) is presented as well as a range of programme responses.
IFES, White Paper, An Integrated Approach to Elections and Conflict (2012)
This IFES White Paper links the conflict cycle to the electoral cycle to identify conflict-sensitive election-management approaches and to identify gaps. The approach emphasizes the need to merge technical expertise with multi-stakeholder initiatives, cross-referencing the conflict cycle with stages in the electoral cycle.
This handbook provides a methodological approach to electoral security assessment, planning, programming, and monitoring and evaluation. The handbook has an Electoral Security Assessment Toolkit that guides a user on historical conflict factors, contextual analysis and election-specific risk factors. The toolkit advises on how to conduct a stakeholder analysis and provides suggested questions for relevant State and non-State actors. The toolkit then provides advice on developing a development hypothesis and an associated electoral-security programming matrix and a series of related worksheets.
Electoral Security Assessment Framework
Applied examples of the electoral security assessment framework are provided for Bangladesh, Colombia and Zimbabwe, conducted in the course of 2010.
The report provides a customized risk assessment commissioned by the Electoral Commission of Nepal and UNDP. The approach and findings are detailed, as is the methodological approach that relied on focus group discussions, interviews, prior conflict and electoral violence mapping and other forms of research, including a final workshop. The report details the methodology used and contains the terms of reference to achieve the findings and associated recommendations. The approach is a particularly useful example in demonstrating a means by which to establish a joint national and international analysis.
National implementation example (India)
The Election Commission of India undertook a comprehensive risk assessment, producing the ‘Manual on Electoral Risk Management’ in 2017, drawing on the IDEA ERM Tool and concepts. The manual represents an extensive analysis and complementary steps for addressing identified risks.
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