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Conflict mapping involves the recording of violence risks and incidents and their nature and location, among other relevant facts, to identify areas of conflict, often as part of early warning systems. Electoral violence risk and incident mapping is one sub-category.
Conflict mapping involves systematically recording and analysing conflict risks, incidents and other relevant data to identify patterns and areas of concern, often as part of a broader early warning system. It is a practical tool that enables stakeholders to better understand conflict dynamics and take timely action to mitigate risks. The process typically involves the following practical steps:
Defining objectives and scope
Identifying data sources
Selecting tools and platforms
Decide on channels for reporting incidents, such as SMS, phone hotlines, smartphone apps or online forms.
Data collection
Enable direct citizen reporting through accessible and inclusive methods, ensuring mechanisms are in place to verify reports.
Data validation and analysis
Producing outputs
Dissemination and action
Continuous monitoring and feedback
Conflict mapping does more than enhance reporting and analysis – it can act as a deterrent to violence by signaling active monitoring. The presence of conflict mapping can encourage accountability, particularly when data are used transparently and responsibly. While often conducted by civil society organizations (CSOs) or international actors, its utility spans a variety of contexts and timeframes, making it a valuable tool for both short-term crisis management and long-term peacebuilding initiatives.
Conflict mapping requires that the details of incidents be systematically classified and should be well defined in the early stages of development.
Conflict mapping is often undertaken as a long-term project, which, if to be used for elections, may need to include additional details beyond regular conflict mapping profiles.
Conflict mapping initiatives can serve a number of purposes, including supporting national authorities (e.g. the security sector and Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)) in their work, early warning systems, advocacy and independent analysis.
As part of an early warning system, a process of analysis, reporting and action needs to follow from conflict mapping to gain the most benefit from its use.
The implementation of conflict mapping is best undertaken by organizations or entities with strong local presence, technical capacity and credibility. Civil society organizations are often well suited due to their grassroots networks, community trust and ability to gather diverse data. International actors involved in peacebuilding or conflict transformation bring technical expertise and access to advanced tools for mapping and analysis.
Human rights commissions may be well placed due to their connections with CSOs and State institutions, combined with their independent nature. Electoral Management Bodies play a critical role by providing official election-related data and collaborating with mapping initiatives to identify risks linked to electoral processes. In contexts requiring broader coordination, coalitions of stakeholders, including CSOs, academic institutions and international organizations, can ensure comprehensive coverage. When sensitive security data are involved, State institutions may play a key role, though collaboration with neutral actors is essential to maintain trust and transparency. The choice of lead implementer should balance technical capability, impartiality and access to reliable data.
For this exercise, it is important to understand how people may view the conduct of the mapping and reporting. To ensure context specificity and sensitivity in mapping electoral risks and incidents, it is critical to conduct this exercise with impartiality and objectivity while carefully studying and taking into consideration the local sociopolitical, cultural and historical dynamics at play in the locations where the mapping will be taking place.
Where the focus is on electoral violence, and given the potential sensitive character of conducting an electoral violence mapping, it is recommended that the personnel conducting it come from the same communities, with the acknowledgment that being able to effectively understand the context and communicate in local language is relevant. It is important to understand that the deployment of monitors to conduct mappings is not conducted in isolation. Rather on occasions, deployment may be perceived or accused as being aligned with one side or another in a potential conflict and therefore be considered part of the problem and thereby become the target.
Youth can be involved throughout the process of mapping of conflict and/or electoral violence risks and incidents either at the reporting, verification or response phases. Through partnership and coordination with youth-led CSOs and networks that may be present either at the local, regional or national level, the reporting and verification phases can be bolstered by having an extensive network of monitors in the field that can assist in the collection and verification of incidents and risks, provided their coverage and proximity to the locations where the risks and incidents are taking place is feasible. Lastly, youth-led CSOs can play an influential and important role in the response to risks and incidents, often being well placed and close to local communities, thereby able to mediate between communities to avert the worst effects of certain risks and incidents from taking place.
To effectively map conflict risks and incidents, it is crucial to include gender-sensitive indicators that monitor how (electoral) violence manifests across different genders. These indicators should capture not only physical violence but also more subtle forms, such as harassment, intimidation and online abuse that often target women and marginalized gender groups. Indicators should also reflect risks specific to women, such as threats related to their political participation or their roles as voters, candidates or election officials when focusing on electoral processes.
In addition to strong indicators, conducting gender-sensitivity training for staff involved in data collection and analysis is essential. These trainings help staff recognize gender-based violence, which can sometimes be underreported or mischaracterized, and ensure that they can handle reports of violence with care and confidentiality. In high-risk environments, setting up gender situation rooms – dedicated spaces that monitor and respond to gender-based electoral violence in real-time – can enhance responsiveness. These rooms focus on collecting gender-disaggregated data, tracking incidents and providing quick support for affected individuals, ensuring that the risks and incidents affecting women and marginalized genders receive the attention and action they require.
Communication around efforts related to the monitoring of conflict risks and incidents needs to be conducted with caution. Depending on the context, an evaluation needs to be made on the benefits and risks associated with communicating – or not communicating – on actions regarding mapping of violence risks and incidents. In some contexts, proper communication may help avoid misperceptions and accusations that may target the staff conducting the mapping, while in other situations this may be counter-productive, putting field staff security at risk while they are executing their mandate and tasks. Therefore, on a context-basis, careful evaluations are needed to assess whether the benefits of communication on the exercise outweighs the potential risks that may be associated with it.
Coordinating with a diverse range of stakeholders is essential for effectively mapping conflict risks and incidents, as each group brings unique expertise, resources and perspectives to the process. Electoral Management Bodies are key actors because they oversee the election process and have the mandate to ensure a secure environment. They can provide valuable data on electoral procedures and serve as a hub for collaboration with other stakeholders. Security forces and law enforcement agencies are critical for identifying areas prone to violence, understanding local security dynamics and responding to incidents.
Civil society organizations, especially those focused on human rights, women’s rights and marginalized groups, play a vital role in mapping conflict and (electoral) violence, as they often have deep-rooted connections with local communities and are trusted sources of information. Engaging with election observer groups can also help integrate global best practices and provide an external perspective on risk monitoring. Lastly, partnering with political parties can promote dialogue around reducing violence, encouraging peaceful campaigns and holding parties accountable for the actions of their supporters.
To ensure that the mapping of conflict and violence risks and incidents exercises is sustainable, specific attention needs to be paid to matters such as the costs of personnel, logistics and digital expenses. For electoral violence risk and incident mapping specifically, to sustain the efforts beyond an electoral process, or reinitiate efforts in an upcoming process, it is critical to ensure funds are allocated to cover matters such as personnel recruitment and costs, alongside logistics cost such as transport, accommodations and reporting means (i.e. phones, SMS and Internet subscriptions, etc.). Furthermore, recurrent costs that will be associated with the use of any digital means for the reporting and collection of electoral violence risks and incidents such as platform hosting, maintenance and security costs need to be considered.
Conducting a conflict mapping exercise may need to take into account certain costs linked to this exercise:
Conflict mapping needs to ensure that robust verification processes are used to confirm details of reports – or that a mechanism is in place to differentiate between verified and non-verified reports.
Classifying political violence and electoral violence through regular conflict mapping systems may require additional political and electoral analysis.
Arguably one of the best-known systems, the Ushahidi system allows for crowd sourcing via a series of communications systems (SMS, email and Twitter). The system allows for data management and analysis, mapping and alert notifications. The system is now available in several scalable solutions from basic to enterprise with a variety of pricing plans.
The iReport system is UNDP’s mechanism to support national partners in the prevention and mitigation of a diverse array of risks and incidents, whether during electoral (i.e. electoral violence, violence against women in elections and politics, etc.) or non-electoral processes (i.e. human rights violations, natural disasters, health emergencies, etc.). The system includes specific capacity-building modalities and methodologies, alongside a digital platform allowing multiple institutions to coordinate in the reporting, analysis, verification and collection of threats.
Election Risk Management Tool (International IDEA)
The IDEA Election Risk Management Tool (ERMTool) launched its development in 2009 and became available as a free resource in 2013. The tool exists as a turnkey ICT solution (a custom database solution) that allows for the customization and collection of data. It generates risk maps and maintains a register of risks and actions. The ICT tool is complemented by three guides for 36 internal and external risks, as well as a manual to consider preventive actions based around a three-tier approach of addressing electoral management and justice, election security and infrastructure for peace. The ERMTool is intended to assist EMBs in managing electoral risks but may also be used by other stakeholders with an interest in managing electoral risks.
Kenya 2007–2008 post-election violence
The purpose of mapping Kenya’s post-election violence was to track the ethnic and political clashes that erupted across various regions, aiding in humanitarian efforts and legal accountability for the violence. Data included incidents of ethnic violence, numbers of displaced people, areas of property destruction and police interventions. The maps were crucial for identifying the hardest-hit regions like Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu, facilitating targeted peacebuilding efforts and judicial responses.
Nigeria 2011 elections
Mapping electoral violence in Nigeria aimed to highlight violence hotspots, particularly in northern states, for better security and peacebuilding initiatives during future elections. The data included locations of violent incidents, deaths, attacks on polling stations, and religious or ethnic conflicts. These maps helped predict where violence might recur and guided the deployment of security forces to prevent further unrest.
Côte d’Ivoire 2010–2011 post-election crisis
The purpose of mapping electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire was to visualize the spread of conflict and assist humanitarian organizations in delivering aid, particularly in regions with large-scale displacement and ethnic tensions. Data included violent clashes, military activity, refugee flows and property destruction, which helped organizations prioritize areas most affected by the post-election crisis, such as Abidjan and the western regions near Liberia.
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