How to achieve credible, inclusive and peaceful elections in the digital age, whilst benefiting from the advantages of modern technology? This question is set to define how elections evolve over the coming years and decades.

An election can be evaluated on several axes, but perhaps one of the fundamental measures is the degree of confidence various stakeholders have in the process. It is a leading factor in the ultimate acceptance of the results and the potential for electoral or political violence. Much investment has been made in exploring how to build confidence in elections, such as professional election delivery, inclusive processes, independent bodies, transparency, amongst others.

The digital age has introduced new dynamics to the relationship between stakeholders and their confidence in electoral processes. The main waves of disruption are tectonic changes in how people communicate, and new technological solutions to public service delivery. For some, these developments may support more successful elections and vibrant democracies. Other fear these may fatally undermine public confidence in elections and democratic institutions.

Technologies potential is inherently contradictory. It can be simultaneously divisive and unifying. Exclusive and inclusive. Which outcomes prevail are a function of how they are designed, deployed, the context in which they are deployed and the actions of electoral stakeholders.

To gain an insight on how to achieve favoured electoral outcomes, the European Union Foreign Policy Instrument and UNDP held a Global Conference in Brussels from 8-10 November 2023, under the Sustaining Peace during Electoral Processes ‘’SELECT’’ Project conference. The event allowed the engagement of election practitioners and information integrity experts from around the world to exchange view and experiences, pose recommendations, and identify questions.

Below are key takeaways from this event and the work of UNDP, providing considerations for engaging with elections in the digital age:

Democratic governance in the digital age

1. Democracy has been in regression for years. Disruption in the modes and ownership of political communication invoked by technology has been posited by many as contributing to this decline.
2. Digital technologies hold the potential to contribute towards societal good and ill. The ultimate impact of technology upon democratic governance rests upon a number of factors, including the design of the technology itself, prioritisation of trust and safety, governance frameworks, and socio-political-technological context within which they are deployed. It is vital that local and global efforts strive to establish conditions which support technology to contribute towards human flourishing, including through international regulatory means.
3. Despite the need for more international cooperation in the digital age, a lack of consensus over fundamental norms makes it difficult to determine how empowering or corrosive technology is, or often what is classified as a societal good. While challenging, enhancing global conversations on this is essential to future democratic governance.
4. Service delivery is fundamental to good governance, and technology has the potential to reform practice, with inclusion and effectiveness at its core.

Digital threats to elections

1. Within this document, are a myriad of ways the digital age has reinforced or introduced new dynamics to electoral processes. These phenomena are inextricably intertwined, calling for a holistic consideration of digital threats to elections, and how they can be averted. Looking forward, threats will inevitably grow as practice innovates and technologies emerge, not least artificial intelligence.
2. There are a range of digital threats to elections, and while information pollution is a considerable one, it is not alone. Other examples include; censorship, internet shutdowns and throttling, cybersurveillance, privacy violations and cyberattacks.
3. There is a broad consensus between election practitioners, information integrity practitioners and the general public that information pollution is a material concern to elections across the world, with many countries already believing it to have had a deleterious impact upon their elections. They also agree there are insufficient protections in place to challenge its impact.
4. Online information pollution has offline and historical analogies, and their potency is frequently rooted in broader grievances.
5. However, the internet, and particular social media platforms, have a set of features which can amplify information pollution in ways beyond legacy media and traditional information distribution methods.
6. The election period introduces additional characteristics which further complicate the information ecosystem. The spike in political activity, the broad and partisan public stakes, international interests, high stakes to candidates and votes alike, a requirement for plurality and inclusion of political speech, and the need to provide a level playing field, are just some of the features.
7. The election also introduces a number of specific targets for information pollution campaigns, including the election management body, and the election process itself, Credible elections have always relied upon the perceived legitimacy of the administrative institution and its work, which can
   be unduly undermined by information pollution.
8. Political actors have long deployed electoral violence to advance their electoral interests, often using disinformation as a tactic to mobilise their supporters, undermine their opponents, or promote false narratives about the electoral process. There are concerns that the internet, and online platforms, have provided an under regulated yet potentially powerful medium to instigate electoral violence with few, if any, consequences. There is also a fear that major platforms are designed with the goal of maximising user engagement. This includes elevating content designed to trigger emotional
   responses, which in turn potentially contributes to electoral violence.
9. Artificial Intelligence is preoccupying the electoral and disinformation communities, as it is many other fields. Artificial Intelligence is expected to have a transformative influence upon much of modern life, and elections are not exempted. Generative AI will make the production of seemingly authentic and evocative harmful content easier, cheaper and more scalable. AI may also be deployed to support the distribution of information pollution, including though the creation of fake accounts or facsimileing convincing engagement.
10. Building protections against the weaponization of Artificial Intelligence in electoral information environments is vital but complex, with defenses likely to incorporate regulatory, educational and technological approaches. There is a need for international cooperation given the global nature of the issue.
11. Artificial intelligence also promises to support the integrity and inclusion of elections, both as a counter measure to adversarial AIs, but it may also create new opportunities for greater participation, voter information and equal competition.

How to protect the electoral information environment

1. The digital age poses numerous and significant challenges to the electoral information environment, demanding a new family of activities designed to promote information integrity and protect the election process.
2. The electoral authorities, other governmental bodies, civil society, platforms, academic, the media and the political contestants are the key actors involved in the electoral information space. Each holds the potential to strengthen or weaken the information environment, through their actions, or inaction. For example, the EMB is the target of information pollution, but also has a responsibility to protect work within its mandate by providing access to reliable information on the election and having the capacities to combat disinformation narratives intended to deter participation or undermine its credibility.
3. Different actors hold different strengths and capabilities. A core goal of actors in this space should be engaged in a multi-stakeholder approach to the challenge, establishing structures which allow them to work in concert, to allow them to be most effective. These relationships may come in the form of coordination bodies, loose information sharing groups, communities of practice, or more formal arrangements to collaborate on specific activities. Furthermore, such engagement will permit the sharing of knowledge, and a greater capacity of advocacy.
4. Where possible, the responses should be guided by a strategy – a strategy which may complement a broader national vision of how to tackle the challenges of information pollution. These may be plans for the governmental institutions, or a broader multi-stakeholder vision, depending upon the realities of the context.
5. While there is a spike in the information pollution during the operational and campaigning period directly preceding an election, a more longitudinal vision is important to address increasingly protracted attacks on electoral institutions, and strengthening broader resilience in advance of the peaks.
6. When conceptualising a program of activities, a framework can be developed on 1) how to detect and respond to information pollution during the election 2) how to build the underlying public resilience to information pollution, 3) how to regulate the landscape to deter actors from disseminating information pollution and platforms for facilitating it. More detail on each can be found on the SELECT website Information Integrity Report – Select (sustainingpeace-select.org)

Detect and response to information pollution

1. Identifying and responding to information pollution in the course of an election process is a critical area of work when attempting to defend an on-going election. Approaches such as online content monitoring and analysis, fact checking, open source investigations and strategic communication are common.
2. There may be various actors charged with defending the electoral information environment. Part of this responsibility is to monitor the information environment and effectively address harmful content and narratives. However, there is a broad consensus that content level responses are not sufficient.
3. Fact checking, as an activity typically delivered by civil society, media and other civilian groupings, is a vital and popular activity around election processes. However, its limitations in reaching and affecting
   the views shaped by information pollution need to be acknowledged. In turn, these limits inform which complementary actions are selected, designed and delivered.
4. Election management bodies are well advised to invest in tools and structures including partnerships to better understand and respond to the information environment, as well as develop their strategic communications competence to better defend their staff, the institution, and the election process from
   malicious actors.

Building public resilience to information pollution

1. Efforts to build greater personal resilience to information pollution can focus on educational activities and informational capacity building. This stream of work can mitigate gaps in content related approaches.
2. Civic education has been a long-standing activity within the election process, however, should be retooled to build voter knowledge and combat potential information pollution campaigns.
3. Enhancing digital literacy and critical thinking are vital to building broad public resilience to modern information pollution. It is an area of work only recently gaining popularity, increasing the need for rigorous accompanying research to allow the community to understand what works.
4. Building an information ecosystem which provides reliable and trusted information is vital. The election management body, civil society, and the media all have responsibilities, and yet their level of public confidence may require careful consideration of the best type of programming and partners for each type of activity.

Approaches to regulating political speech and information pollution

1. Influencing the behaviour of political actors in the information environment can provide another approach to constrain and disincentivize the propagation of information pollution. There are a range of approaches, =such as legally binding to voluntary guidelines, and from supranational frameworks to extremely local agreements. Fundamentally, coercing political actors, platforms and media to contribute to the healthy information ecosystem – either through legal or political means – can be beneficial if successful.
2. Any approach to create accountability within the electoral information ecosystem should prioritise human rights approaches, most relevant of which is freedom of expression.
3. A multi-stakeholder approach is warranted during the design of any regulatory activity. It is the right of vulnerable groups and communities to be included in the conversations taking place – be in at a local, national or international level.
4. Regulation of online platforms can be used to shape the information environment towards promoting reliable information, reducing information pollution and assigning accountability to what has become a set of key actors in the election process. A word of caution is required, however, as regulatory processes are open to abuse and manipulation.
5. Codes of Conduct can provide a more agile means of building guard-rails around the activities of political parties and other electoral actors and provide a means to avoid some of the concerns around government abuse. However, these approaches must be designed in a context specific manner in order
   to be effective, including consideration towards monitoring and enforcement.

Digital Inclusion, and exclusion

1. Inclusion is a fundamental tenant in the conduct of elections, however, despite various efforts some contexts have experienced a regression in recent years.
2. Democratic participation can flourish as a result of digital technology, allowing for increased means for participation and community engagement, new ways to access information and the provision of accessible election technology. Data can improve programming and services delivery.
3. However, some of the observed decline in inclusion is likely to be a result of technology in the political sphere, with factors such as the digital divide, lack of trust, and systematic bias undermining inclusion.
4. As technology is introduced within elections, stakeholders should consider its impact upon inclusion, paying attention to intersectionality, and designing methods to alleviate inequities – for election administration but also within the information environment.

Violence against women

1. Online violence against women has become an endemic concern within elections, deployed to make public life untenable for aspiring female politicians and supporters.
2. The issues of gendered online discrimination are underpinned by more fundamental prejudices within societies – biases held be both women and men. Accordingly, programmatic options should acknowledge and address these underlying drivers.
3. Despite the disturbing extent of abuse against women, there are a range of activities that can and should be deployed to protect them, strengthen their participation and introduce accountability ranging from awareness raising and engagement to capacity building and legislative reform coupled with enforcement strategies.

Youth participation in the digital elections

1. It is crucial to involve youth in the design and execution of activities intended to promote peaceful and inclusive elections, in order to increase their potential for success.
2. Despite the value of using technology to engage youth within the electoral process, it can be inadequate to meaningfully engage in all circumstances – especially where there is intersectionality with other attitudinal or material constraints.

Election administration in the digital age

1. Digital transformation of election administration has been a prominent concern for election management bodies for many years, with many undertakings important reforms to make services more accessible, efficient and secure. It is an area in which a number of participants to the Global Conference reported their need for greater assistance.
2. Successful digital transformation in the context of electoral administration requires approaches which prioritise the building of public trust in the technology and the broader electoral process.
3. Key ways of building confidence around the deployment of electoral technology include a gradual roll out that allows trust to be established in a measured fashion. Also vital is a professional election administration capable of taking all measures possible to deliver a successful deployment, even if the scale of the initial rollouts is limited.
4. Considerations about accessibility and the digital divide are expected to remain relevant for the foreseeable future. They should remain front of mind when devising new technologies intended to reach voters, or other stakeholders.
5. Cyber-security is an acute concern for election administrators as they face increasingly sophisticated and varied threat actors. Building appropriate structures, engaging specialists and building strong digital capacities can provide a significant improvement in the integrity of the election management bodies digital infrastructure.
6. Artificial intelligence is of rising interest to the community of election administrators, with hopes that it can provide important benefits to how elections are delivered. Already there is adoption of AI tools by electoral authorities seeking to enhance their work. Its application is envisaged in various aspects of their work, potentially enhancing current approaches, or even transforming the nature of election administration.
7. Artificial Intelligence within the sensitive area of election delivery should be approached with due diligence. Despite its potential contributions, it is still in its nascently, especially within the context of election administration. With this emerging practice comes a non-negligible risk, of either failure or,
   worse still, unintended, and deleterious outcomes.

The digital age is changing how to deliver credible elections. Election practitioners across the world are navigating this new world, with both optimism and trepidation. There is no denying that in many ways, the next generation of elections will different vastly from those that have come before. Throughout the various stages of the SELECT project, various examples of innovative practices in electoral inclusion and integrity have been shared. And yet, the new hurdles reassert the importance of enduring electoral principles for electoral administration.

More than ever, professional election administration is needed to tackle potentially highly technical operations and complex threats. In an information environment where a small infraction can be leapt on with accusations of obscene bias, maintaining actual and perceived independence and impartiality of election management administration has never been more important, or difficult. Transparency is of even greater importance, with information vacuums more easily filled by malicious actors.

In practice, these principles can hold contradictions and require difficult decisions, especially in line with some of the recommendations discussed. For example: as electoral digital infrastructure is intertwined with various private and public institutions, dependences increase, and some degree of independence of action will be traded for efficiencies. Building all-of-society responses to information threats have been highlighted as vital but can invite accusations of impartiality. Professionalism is inescapable, but it also a matter of degree – which needs to be weighed against costs. Transparency is important, but with adoption of the complex algorithms, will be harder to be meaningfully understood. Evaluating trade-offs is no simple feat. The technical complexities make it harder to reach informed decisions.

The collective design and adoption of standards and best practice in these areas becomes particularly important. Looking forward, UNDP strives to support the electoral community in exploring these necessary questions.

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